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Recent trends in neurophilosophy question the validity of conceptions as to the nature of mental states and of "folk psychology" (FP) in general. One school of thought, the "eliminative materialistics," see FP as a misdirected and scientifically redundant approach to the mind which should be discarded; the "functionalists," in contrast, consider FP categories, such as belief, to be essential. Between these extremes other neurophilosophical positions affect the way we view mental life. This paper extends the debate to include a consideration of abnormal mental states. It is argued that approaches to phenomenology and psychopathology cannot be immune from any conceptual reconfiguration of normal mental life which might occur. The manner and extent to which psychiatric theory and practice may be affected as a result of these developments is discussed.

Original publication

DOI

10.1097/00005053-199106000-00002

Type

Journal article

Journal

J Nerv Ment Dis

Publication Date

06/1991

Volume

179

Pages

309 - 316

Keywords

Cognition, Humans, Mental Disorders, Mental Processes, Models, Neurological, Models, Psychological, Neurosciences, Philosophy, Psychiatry, Psychopathology, Research, Terminology as Topic